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Abstract 
Whether a trade ban on a product imposed because of the fact that the 
process-and-production-method (PPM) of that product is harmful to the 
environment can be consistent with the WTO law? The purpose of this paper is to 
trace what the panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO have done in settlement 
of disputes concerning this problem and especially to think about a possible 
‘evolutionary’ role the Appellate Body can play in resolution of ‘trade and 
environment’ disputes. 
This paper begins first to consider generally the essential characteristics of 
the problem of so called 'trade and environment' and then to identify a special 
problem which is raised by these characteristics in the context of the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO. Second, in a more substantial level, this paper will 
consider what a trade related environmental measure (TREM) based on a PPM is 
and then identify the issues of its possible inconsistency with the WTO law. Third, 
we will trace how the panels and the Appellate Body have disposed of these issues 
in practice and also make some analysis of a new approach adopted by the Appellate 
Body in interpreting the WTO law in recent two cases. In conclusion, this paper will 
affirmatively evaluate this new approach and remark that the Appellate Body does 
not need to ‘live with a quiet but uneasy status quo’ in the ‘trade and environment’ 
disputes.   - 1 -
I. Introduction 
How is it possible to reconcile trade liberalization with environmental 
protection? This is among the most urgent questions facing the new trade 
round negotiation, the Doha Development Agenda, of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 1 In particular, the issue of the permissibility of 
process-and-production-method (PPM)-based trade measures under the 
WTO law is the most difficult and controversial one afflicting WTO lawyers. 
The problem can be described in a nutshell as follows: whether a trade ban 
on a product imposed because of the fact that the PPM of that product is 
harmful to the environment can be consistent with the WTO law?2 
The purpose of this paper is to trace what the panels and the 
Appellate Body of the WTO have done in settlement of disputes concerning 
the above problem and especially to think about a possible evolutionary role  
the Appellate Body can play in resolution of ‘trade and environment’ 
disputes. 
In order to do so, this paper begins first to consider generally the 
essential characteristics of the problem of so called ‘trade and environment’ 
and then to identify a special problem which is raised by these 
characteristics in the context of the dispute settlement system of the WTO 
(II). Second, in a more substantial level, this paper will consider what a trade 
related environmental measure (TREM) based on a PPM is and then identify 
the issues of its possible inconsistency with the WTO law (III). Third, we will 
trace how the panels and the Appellate Body have disposed of these issues in 
practice and also make some analysis of a new approach adopted by the 
Appellate Body in interpreting the WTO law in recent two cases (IV). In 
                                                  
1  The Doha Ministerial Declaration adopted on 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1, 20 
November 2001), which launched the new trade round negotiation called the Doha 
Development Agenda, provides the mandate for negotiation, among others, ‘with a view to 
enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment, on the relationship 
between WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental 
agreements.’ See Paragraph 31 of this declaration. 
2  There are many comments and articles on this problem. See, among others, Markus 
Schlagenhof, Trade Measures Based on Environmental Process and Protection Methods, 29 
JWTL 123 (1995); Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction-An 
Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 EJIL 249 (2000); Robert E. 
Hudec, The Product-Process Doctrine in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence, in NEW DIRECTIONS 
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 
187 (Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick eds., Kluwer Law International, 2000); Sanford E. 
Gaines, Processes and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for Environmental 
PPM-Based Trade Measures?, 27 COLUM. J. ENVIRON’L L. 383 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, 
The Law of Environmental ‘PPMs’ in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 59 (2002); Satoru Taira, Trade and the Environment: The Possible Consistency of 
PPM-Based Trade Measures with GATT1994, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES: CONFLICT AND COHERENCE 309 (Chi Carmody, 
Yuji Iwasawa & Sylvia Rhodes eds., American Society of International Law, 2003).   - 2 -
conclusion, this paper will consider a possible evolutionary role that the 
Appellate Body can play in resolution of ‘trade and environment’ disputes by 
evaluating this new approach (V). 
II. The Characteristics of the Problem 
1. The Characteristics of the Problem of ‘Trade and Environment’ 
The essence of the controversy concerning the problem of ‘trade and 
environment’ is summarized as follows.   
On the one hand, environmentalists argue that the values of free 
trade conflict with the values of environment. According to them, trade 
liberalization creates new market opportunities and enhances economic 
activity. Trade also generates wealth, which allows consumers to acquire 
higher economic outputs. But freer trade and economic growth, if they go 
without fair payments of the costs(‘internalization’ 3 ), result in the 
unsustainable consumption of natural resources and waste production and 
lead to increased pollution and other environmental harm(‘externality’4). 
Trade agreements contain market access provisions that can be used to 
override domestic environmental regulations. Environment represents a 
higher-order and a more emergent value than trade. TREMs to enforce 
environmental standard are justified as leverage to promote worldwide 
environmental protection, particularly to address global or transboundary 
environmental problems and to reinforce international environmental 
agreements as in treaties designed to protect the ozone layer,5 manage 
hazardous waste trade,6 and preserve endangered species,7 without regard 
to disruption to trade or any cost/benefit analysis. Countries with lax 
environmental standards have a competitive advantage in the global 
                                                  
3  ‘Internalization’ means inclusion of pollution-related damages into a product’s price. As to 
the ‘Polluter Pay Principle’, the Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration says as follows: 
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the 
approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due 
regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and 
investment. 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, reprinted in 31 ILM 
876 (1992). 
4  As to a definition of ‘externality’, Samuelson, for an example, says as follows: 
[A]n externality is an effect of one economic agent’s behavior on another’s well-being 
where that effect is not reflected in market transactions. 
SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS, at 331(16th ed. 1998).   
5  Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 26 
ILM 1550(1987). 
6  Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal, 22 March 1989, 28 ILM 657(1989). 
7  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, 3 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243.   - 3 -
marketplace and put pressure on countries with high environmental 
standards to reduce the rigor of their environmental requirements. TREMs 
make the latter countries possible to avoid such a pressure. In the context of 
the North-South problem, TREMs are also justified by the urgent necessity 
not to make the South follow the wrong way the North took at the crisis of 
the global commons.8  
On the other hand, free traders argue mainly as follows. 
Environmental values and trade values are complementary and the latter 
serves the former. If consumption of a country’s environmental resources is 
correctly priced, liberal trade improves a country’s overall welfare and leads 
to more efficient use of natural resources. Increased economic growth 
stimulates the demand for environmental protection, generates additional 
income to pay for it and leads to improve environmental standards and 
protection techniques. Problematic is not the harm that free trade does to the 
environment but the harm that TREMs do to free trade. TREMs undermine 
the concept of comparative cost advantages9  upon which the basic principles 
of liberal trade rest and bring inefficiency and reduction of economic 
welfare.10 In the context of the North-South problem, TREMs of the North 
applied to imports from the South can be equated with unilateral exportation 
of the North’s own environmental policy to the South. They infringe the 
sovereign right of developing countries to dispose their own natural 
resources. Many environmental problems in the South can largely be 
attributed to the lower income level and the complex problems of poverty. 
TREMs would make it more difficult for those countries to earn foreign 
exchange income of their exports and, therefore, disturb their economic 
development. They would aggravate environmental problems in these 
countries.11 Free traders criticize that environmentalists have not proved 
the causal link between the deterioration of the environment and free trade 
and that they also have not established that TREMs are the most efficient 
way to change the environmental policy of the exporting country. Trade per 
se is not the source of environmental problems, but rather various forms of 
‘market failures’12  and ‘government failures.’13  Therefore, TREMs cannot be 
                                                  
8  See Schlagenhof, supra note 2, at 123; see also Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade 
Regime, 10 EJIL 739-740(1999); ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT 
AND THE FUTURE, Institute for International Economics, at 43(1994). 
9  The theory of comparative cost advantages can be briefly explained as follows: the 
difference of resource endowment among nations makes the difference of the cost of 
production and results in comparative cost advantageous and disadvantageous industries in 
each country. In this case, each country should specialize its production in the comparative 
cost advantageous industries to make international division of production. By doing so, the 
most effective and proper use and allocation of resources can be realized. Then, if countries 
can, by free trade, exchange the products that are fruits of international division of 
production, all these countries can maximize their economic welfare.       
10  See Schlagenhof, supra note 2, at 123-124. 
11  See id., at 124. 
12  For example, the failure to internalize external costs or the absence of the concept of   - 4 -
the appropriate instrument to achieve environmental goals. There is also 
danger that unilateral TREMs become a disguised protectionist instrument 
for domestic competitors seeking relief from international competition.14 
The use of TREMs may also undermine the cooperation necessary for the 
continued functioning of the trade regime.15 
  Despite of this controversy between environmentalists and free 
traders, respecting both the environmental value and the trade value seems 
to be essential for sustainable development and welfare of human beings. 
Therefore, both values should not be considered as inherently conflicting, but 
as mutually complementary.16 And in this sense, the essence of the problem 
is how to best strike a balance between the environmental value and the 
trade value.   
It is well said, however, that this very striking the balance between 
these two values presents issues that are among the most ‘contested’ in trade 
policy and that are currently contested in a way that appears to remove them 
from the legal domain, and place them squarely in the political domain. 
Professor Dunoff expresses appropriately this point as follows: 
To be sure, many trade policy issues are contested in the sense that 
they are subject to disagreement and dispute, but the claim here is 
that the many ‘trade and’ issues are ‘contested’ in a much more 
fundamental way. They are ‘contested’ in the sense that 
fundamentals of the debate―say, the balance to be struck between 
economic and environmental interests—are ‘up for grabs’ and that 
participants in these debates acknowledge the legitimacy of 
disagreement over these fundamental issues. In this sense, the 
question of basic GATT policy towards tariffs is not contested, while 
that of GATT policy regarding, say, competition [or environmental] 
issues, is highly contested.17(Some added by this author) 
2. A Special Problem Raised in the Context of the Dispute Settlement System 
of the WTO 
If we grasp the problem of ‘trade and environment’ as having such 
                                                                                                                                            
‘right to environment’ as a property right. See also id., at 124, n. 11. 
13  For example, agricultural subsidies leading to excessive use of chemical fertilizer 
polluting soil and water. See also, id., n.12. 
14  See id., at 123-24; see also, Petersmann, International Trade Law and International 
Environmental Law, Prevention and Settlement of International Environmental Disputes in 
GATT, 27 JWT 43, at 43 and 48. 
15  See Dunoff, supra note 8, at 740. 
16  See Paragraph 31 of The Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, for the mutual 
supportiveness of trade and environment. 
17  See Dunoff, supra note 8, at 755.   - 5 -
characteristics, a special problem is raised also in the context of the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO. When a WTO negotiating body considers the 
problem of ‘trade and environment,’ it is both expected and appropriate for it 
to declare that it has weighted and struck a balance among all appropriate 
interests and values, and resolved political and policy issues through 
consensus or at least majority process.18 But, as Professor Dunoff acutely 
pointed out, the same is not true for the WTO dispute settlement panels and 
the Appellate Body. According to him, while there has long been debate over 
whether GATT dispute settlement should be a legalistic, rule-based system 
or a more flexible diplomatic mechanism, the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) represents an unequivocal victory for the legalists. 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body are not intended to be simply another 
forum for the political settlement of controversial value conflicts. Rather, 
they are to apply settled law to the facts, to resolve disputes according to 
pre-existing principle. The legitimacy of the dispute settlement system 
would be undermined if panels and the Appellate Body were understood to 
engage in either policy-making or deal-making.19  
But once disputes concerning the problem of ‘trade and environment’ 
are submitted to the dispute settlement system of the WTO, panels or the 
Appellate Body would be in effect asked to draw principled line in the midst 
of larger political struggles. Professor Dunoff continues to say, following the 
above cited expression: 
[I]t is precisely this contestedness that renders it almost impossible 
for panels and the Appellate Body to apply any nuanced test in a 
manner that appears to produce consistent results. Inconsistent 
results in these controversial areas would invite the criticism that 
the outcome are simply political….And any perceived ‘delegalization’ 
of WTO dispute settlement proceedings would threaten to 
delegitimize these proceedings.20 
Indeed, it should be noted that even the WTO’s Director-General 
pleaded recently that the WTO not be asked to serve as ‘judge, jury and 
police’ on international environmental matters. He warned that 
[a]sking the WTO to solve issues which are not central to its work, 
especially when these are issues which governments have failed to 
address satisfactorily in other contexts, is not just a recipe for failure. 
                                                  
18 Id., at 754. 
19  Id., at 754; see also Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A 
Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AJIL 596, at 606(1999). 
20  See Dunoff, id., at 755.   - 6 -
It could do untold harm to trading system itself.21 
Given the institutional constraints on WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body, and the highly politically controversial characteristics of the problem 
of ‘trade and environment,’ it is argued that it is politically naïve to urge 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body to ‘struggle openly’ with the value 
conflicts raised by the problem of ‘trade and environment.’22 
  Then, the questions are as follow; should the WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body refuse to decide disputes concerning the problem of ‘trade 
and environment’ when such disputes are submitted to them?; and should 
the WTO lawyers ‘live with a quiet but uneasy status quo’23 until a WTO 
political body decides a matter?24 By tracing what panels and the Appellate 
Body have done in settlement of the ‘trade and environment’ disputes, these 
questions will be considered below. 
III. Trade Related Environmental Measure Based on a PPM 
1. Substantial Issue to Be Considered Here 
Among substantial issues related to ‘trade and environment,’ the issue of 
consistency of a TREM based on a PPM with the WTO law has been 
addressed by Panels and the Appellate Body. In order to trace and evaluate 
how they have addressed this issue, it is convenient first to consider here 
what is a TREM based on a PPM. 
2. Two Categories of PPM 
As domestic environmental problems become more serious and world 
concern about the global environment grows, there is increasing recognition 
that ‘production externalities’ arising from a PPM in the production process 
of a product often affect the environment more significantly than 
‘consumption externalities’ coming from the use and consumption of a 
product. As a result, in addition to environmental regulations on products, 
States have also had a tendency to concern themselves with how a product is 
produced, manufactured, or obtained. 
PPMs can be classified analytically into two categories, depending on 
whether the resulting product causes an environmental effect during its 
                                                  
21  ‘WTO Cannot be “Judge, Jury, Police” of Environment Issues, Top Official Says,’ BNA 
International Environmental Daily, 18 March 1998, reproduced from id., at 756. 
22  See id. 
23  See id. 
24  Professor Dunoff answers affirmatively to these questions. Id. See also CLAUDE E. 
BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 45-56(AEI Press, 2001).   - 7 -
consumption or production.25 Some PPMs cause ‘consumption externalities.’ 
They change the product’s performance to such an extent that the product 
causes, or threatens to cause, damage to the importing country’s 
environment when it is consumed, used, or disposed of. It is sometimes said 
that these PPMs are ‘materialized’ into the product as such. This category of 
PPMs is directly related to physical characteristic of the product concerned 
and is called a ‘product-related-PPM.’ For example, pesticides used on food 
crops may produce harmful chemical residues; cattle raised on growth 
hormones can produce meat with hormone residues.26 
On the other hand, the second category of PPMs causes 
environmental effects in the production process of a product but neither 
transmits such effects to the product itself nor affects the product’s 
characteristics. These PPMs may lead to ‘production externalities’ not only in 
the producing country but also by their spillover effect in other countries and 
even in the global environment. This category of PPMs is therefore called a 
‘non-product-related PPM.’ Examples include, as referred to below, the 
practice of catching tuna by fishing methods causing high dolphin mortality 
and the incidental capture of large numbers of sea turtles by shrimp 
trawling. In addition, methods of cutting woods without a program of 
sustainable development and cleaning of semi-conductors and other electric 
parts with CHCs are also among these PPMs.27 
3. TREM Based on a PPM Regulation 
In international trade, product-related PPMs are less problematic in that 
importing countries that are also consumption countries can regulate them 
through internal regulations on the product as such. So long as imported 
products are treated the same as domestic like products, they will meet the 
discipline of ‘national treatment’ under Art. III of GATT 1994.28 
Non-product-related PPMs should be properly regulated by process 
standards in producing countries. But if a PPM regulation of a producing 
country is insufficient or ineffective, other countries that suffer from 
production externalities due to transboundary spillover effects may want to 
enforce their own regulation to halt the damage caused by the PPM in issue. 
It is here that a TREM plays its role as a measure to regulate the 
non-product-related PPM. Indeed, the TREM normally takes a form of 
import regulation by an importing country of the good produced by the PPM 
                                                  
25  See OECD Conceptual Framework for PPM Measures, in OECD, TRADE AND 
ENVIRONMENT: PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS, at 149-162(1994). 
26  See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The 
Continuing Serch for Reconciliation, 91 AJIL 268, 288(1997). 
27  See id. 
28  See Schlagenhof, supra note 2, at 126.   - 8 -
in question, but the purpose of the TREM in this case is to make the 
producers of the producing country stop using the PPM in issue, and thus, 
without any agreement among concerned countries, this TREM would be 
seen as extraterritorial and unilateral application of a regulation of this 
importing country and further even criticized as so called ‘eco-imperialism’ 
because the TREM is equated with an unilateral imposition of an 
environmental standard by the importing country. 
The problem becomes further complicated when a 
non-product-related PPM causes production externalities in a more extended 
jurisdictional scope including many countries. The more the number of 
affected countries increases, the more to agree on a suitable sharing among 
the affected countries of the required internalization of environmental 
externalities becomes difficult because of the difference of policy stances of 
the countries concerned on the environmental problem. Thus, the 
circumstances under which TREMs based on a PPM are taken can be 
distinguished according to the degree of attainment of agreement among the 
countries concerned:29  in one case, a country may be obliged to take a TREM 
under a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA); and in another case, 
a country may unilaterally take a TREM arguably based upon some general 
principles of international law, such as the principle of state responsibility 
for transboundary environmental harm. And even in the former case, it is 
necessary to take note that if the target country of the TREM is not a party 
to the MEA, the TREM taken against it can not escape from being criticized 
as an unilateral measure. In the next sections, we will focus on TREMs 
based on a non-product-related PPM and consider the issue of their 
consistency with the WTO law. 
IV. The Issue of the consistency of a TREM based on a PPM with the WTO 
Law 
1. Identification of Some Substantial Issues 
Since there are, as was said above, a variety of circumstances under which 
TREMs based on a PPM are taken, it will be expected that the appraisals of 
the TREMs under international law and the WTO law are delicately 
different case by case depending on each of circumstances. For present 
purposes it is sufficient to identify simply some substantial issues that may 
be raised when a TREM based on a non-product-related PPM taken 
unilaterally by one nation whether by virtue of a MEA or not is appraised 
under the GATT 1994. 
Since a TREM based on a non-product-related PPM is taken usually 
                                                  
29  See OECD Conceptual Framework for PPM Measures, supra note 25, at 157.   - 9 -
in the form of import regulation of the product in question in the importing 
country, the most relevant agreement as the framework of regulation under 
the WTO law is the GATT 1994, which is the core of the regulations of trade 
in goods among the WTO agreements.30 The GATT provides, as the basic 
principles for constructing the liberalized world trading system, 
non-discrimination principles and trade liberation principles, including the 
general prohibition provision of quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff 
measures. The GATT, however, permits departures from these principles in 
exceptional cases that meet certain criteria.31 In the case where a TREM 
based on a non-product-related PPM is taken unilaterally by one nation, 
such a TREM may well raise issues of inconsistency with, among others, the 
‘product-based regulation approach’ and the ‘multilateralism’ in the 
framework of regulation under the GATT. 
2. Inconsistency with the ‘Product-Based Regulation Approach’ under the 
GATT 
The non-discrimination principles of the GATT are: the most-favored-nation 
principle of Article I and the national treatment principle of Article III. The 
former prohibits discrimination among ‘like products’ coming from different 
states of origin. The latter prohibits discrimination between domestic and 
foreign ‘like products.’ The ‘product-based regulation approach’ appears in 
the criteria of likeness according to which the concept of ‘like products’ is 
defined. The GATT itself does not define the concept,32 but certain kinds of 
criteria have been adopted as a legal practice through many dispute 
settlement panel cases. These are: (i) the nature and physical characteristics 
of competing products as they appear at the importer’s border; (ii) tariff 
classifications based on them; (iii) the product’s end-use; and (iv) the 
                                                  
30  Among the WTO agreements, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade(so called 
TBT Agreement) is also relevant here. This agreement, in respect of technical regulations, 
not only provides non-discrimination principles like as the GATT (Article 2.1), but also 
provides that they shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil “legitimate 
objectives” including protection of the environment (Article 2.2). However, since a technical 
regulation is defined as a “document which lays down product characteristics or their 
related processes and production methods(emphasize added)”(Annex I), it is interpreted that 
regulations of non-product-related PPMs are excluded from this definition. As a result, it 
should be noted that the TBT Agreement is interpreted not to be applied to the regulations 
of non-product related PPMs. See Schlagenhof, supra note 2, at 132. 
31  See Article XX of the GATT. 
32  However, under Article 2.6 of the so called Antidumping Agreement (Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994), there is 
a definition of the term like follows: 
Throughout this Agreement the term “like product”(“produit similaire”) shall be   
interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the 
product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product 
which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling 
those of the product under consideration.   - 10 -
consumers’ taste and habits.33Except this last criterion, the finding criteria 
of likeness, in the last analysis, are pursued in the character of a product 
itself, and the factors involved in production, especially the PPM, are made 
irrelevant for the like-product determination. Indeed, product related PPMs 
are in fact taken into account as far as they are materialized into the 
character of the product, but non-product-related PPMs are not taken into 
account at all. As the result, discriminating based on the difference of the 
PPM between products that are found as ‘like products’ by the criteria other 
than the PPM, will be not permitted. As far as one product produced by a 
PPM harmful to the environment and another product produced by a PPM 
friendly to the environment are considered to be ‘like producs’, all these 
products must be treated equally. 
3. Inconsistency with the ‘Multilateralism’ under the GATT 
Article XX of the GATT provides general exceptions to the trade 
liberalization principles of the GATT and permits under certain conditions 
deviation from these principles to realize certain values that have priority 
over trade values. Among these values are included the environmental 
values. Therefore, there is a room for TREMs based on a non-product-related 
PPM being legalized under the GATT by fulfilling the requirements of this 
Article, even if they are otherwise against the trade liberation principles 
under the GATT.34  It is, however, in the interpretation and the application of 
this Article XX that the ‘multilateralism’ in the framework of regulation 
under the GATT has been prominently expressed. Since TREMs based on a 
non-product-related PPM are, as are already said, essentially unilateral and 
extraterritorial in their nature, there is the strong probability that such 
TREMs cannot fulfill the requirements for applying these exceptions and 
thus can not acquire the legalization under Article XX. 
V. The Approaches Adopted by the Panels and the Appellate Body 
                                                  
33  For these criteria, some panels and the Appellate Body have referred to the Working 
Party Report on the Border Tax Adjustments adopted 2 December 1970, BISD 18S/97.   
34  The relevant part of Article XX is as follows: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
… 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
… 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption; 
…   - 11 -
1. Approaches Adopted by the Panels in Tuna/Dolphin Cases 
Here, let’s trace how the panels and the Appellate Body have actually 
disposed of our issues. The famous Tuna/Dolphin cases of 1991 and 1994,35 
which triggered first the controversy of the problem of ‘trade and 
environment’, were just concerned with the inconsistency of a TREM based 
on a non-product-related PPM with the GATT 1947. In these cases, panels 
declared a United States embargo on tuna caught by a fishing method 
causing high dolphin morality to be inconsistent with the GATT 1947 and 
seemed to typically adopt the ‘product-based regulation approach’ and the 
‘multilateralism’ in the framework of regulation under the GATT 1947. 
The 1994 Panel noted in relation to the application of Article III 
providing the national treatment obligation that “Article III calls for a 
comparison between the treatments accorded to domestic and imported like 
products, not for a comparison of the policies or practices of the country of 
origin with those of the country of importation.”36 The Panel, therefore, 
implied that according different treatments to like tuna products based on a 
criterion of a harvesting method which ‘could not have any impact on the 
inherent character of tuna as a product’ would not be permitted under Article 
III.37 This means nothing but that the Panel adopted the ‘product-based 
regulation approach’ and that invoking non-product-related PPMs as a base 
for denying likeliness between products would not be permitted. 
The 1991 Panel, after having found the United States embargo to be 
inconsistent not with Article III but with Article XI,38 continued to examine 
further the possibility of legalization of the embargo under Article XX. As to 
the territorial scope of (b) and (g) of Article XX, on which there is no express 
indication in the texts, the United States argued that (b) and (g) were 
applicable to a measure protecting environmental values outside the 
jurisdiction of the invoking country (like as dolphin in this case).39 The 
Panel, however, dismissed these arguments and said as follows: 
[I]f the broad interpretation of Article XX (b)[ and (g)] suggested by 
the United States were accepted, each contracting parties could 
unilaterally determine the life or health protection policies [and the 
conservation policies] from which other contracting parties could not 
deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the General 
Agreement; The General Agreement would then no longer constitute a 
                                                  
35  United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna(hereinafter Tuna I), in 30 ILM 1594(1991); 
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multilateral framework for trade among all contracting parties.40 
Further, the 1994 Panel declared clearly that Article XX as an 
exception to obligations under the GATT permitted no deviation from the 
‘multilateralism’ of the GATT as follows: 
If Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting parties to deviate 
from the obligations of the General Agreement by taking trade 
measures to implement policies, including conservation policies, 
within their own jurisdiction, the basic objectives of the General 
Agreement would be maintained. If however Article XX were 
interpreted to permit contracting parties to take trade measures so as 
to force other contracting parties to change their policies within their 
jurisdiction, including their conservation policies, the balance of rights 
and obligations among contracting parties, in particular the right of 
access to markets, would be seriously impaired. Under such an 
interpretation the General Agreement could no longer serve as a 
multilateral framework for trade among contracting parties.41 
In short, these panels said that if the provision of Article XX were 
interpreted as permitting extraterritorial measures, one state could 
unilaterally decide its environmental policy and other states which did not 
comply with this policy would be denied their right under the GATT and that 
this would lead to the collapse of the multilateral framework of the GATT. It 
should be noted that the both panels cited above refused dauntlessly the 
unilateralism in order to keep the ‘multilateralism’ under the GATT. 
According to these panels, TREMs based on a non-product-related PPM 
having such a unilateral and extraterritorial character were doubtlessly 
incompatible with the ‘multilateralism’ under the GATT. 
Thus, according to the panels of Tuna/Dolphin cases, TREMs based 
on a non-product-related PPM encounter obstacles of the ‘product-based 
regulation approach’ and the ‘multilateralism’ of the GATT and can not 
acquire their consistency with the GATT. 
From our perspective, it is also interesting to note that the 1991 
Panel underlined that its task was limited to the examination of this matter 
“in the light of the relevant GATT provisions”42 and added in its concluding 
remark that the adoption of its report would not affect “the right of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES acting jointly to address international 
environmental problems which can only be resolved through measures in 
                                                  
40  Id., paras. 5.27 and 5.32. 
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conflict with the present rules of the General Agreement.”43  We can discover 
here that this Panel itself raised the question whether the panel is the 
appropriate place to frame an appropriate rule to accommodate the opposing 
policies involved or, alternatively, whether this task belongs more 
appropriately to a political organ. 
2. New Approaches Adopted by the Appellate Body in the Asbestos and 
Shrimp/Turtle Cases 
Two recent WTO cases, however, deserve attention in that they imply that 
the above approaches adopted by Tuna/Dolphin cases should be amended. 
First, in the Asbestos case of 2000,44 Canada challenged a French ban on 
asbestos in construction materials. Asbestos has been long known to be a 
deadly carcinogen. Canada argued that the asbestos it exports was a ‘like 
product’ to the substitute products used in construction in France, therefore 
deserving no less favorable treatment under the national treatment 
obligation of Article III of the GATT. In this case, the Appellate Body made a 
noteworthy ruling that implies the amendment of the above ‘product-based 
regulation approach’ under Article III.   
In assessing the ‘likeness’ between asbestos and the substitute 
products, the Appellate Body noted first that “a determination of “likeness” 
under Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a determination about the nature and 
extent of a competitive relationship between and among products” in the 
marketplace.45 Setting this forth as a premise, the Appellate Body pointed 
out that the evidence relating to the health risks associated with asbestos 
might influence consumers’ behavior and might be relevant in assessing the 
competitive relationship in the marketplace between allegedly ‘like’ products 
in this case.46  The Appellate Body, thus, reversed the Panel’s conclusion that 
the asbestos and the substitute products are ‘like products’ under Article 
III.47 
This ruling suggests that the evidence relating to environmental 
harm of a product may influence consumers’ behavior and competitive 
relationship of the product in the marketplace and that the likeness of an 
environmentally harmful product and an environmentally non-harmful 
product may be denied. And, further, this implies that even in the case of a 
product made by an environmentally harmful non-product-related PPM, if 
                                                  
43  Id., para. 6.4. 
44  European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products(hereinafter Asbestos), Report of the Panel, WT/DS135/R, 18 September; Report of 
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consumers can identify such a PPM,48 the likeness of the product and other 
product may be denied. If so, TREMs based on a non-product-related PPM, 
after all, may be able to avoid the inconsistency with Article III. 
Second, in the Shrimp/Turtle case of 1998, 49  India,  Malaysia, 
Pakistan and Thailand complained about a United States ban on the 
importation of shrimp caught by trawlers that do not employ a special device 
in their nets to protect sea turtles from being trapped and killed. Once again 
the problem of the unilateral and extraterritorial TREM based on a 
non-product-related PPM was the central question. In this case, the 
Appellate Body also made a noteworthy ruling that imply alleviation of 
rigorous application of the ‘multilateralism’ under Article XX, and showed its 
flexibility permitting a unilateral TREM under a certain condition.   
In its 1998 report, the Appellate body, in examining whether the 
TREM in this case is justified under Article XX, considered that the 
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX maintain a balance between the 
right of a Member to invoke any of exceptions, on the one hand, and the 
substantive rights of the other Members under the GATT1994, on the other 
hand 50 and also observed that the chapeau of Article XX is but one 
expression of the principle of good faith.51 According to the Appellate Body, 
the United States failed to engage shrimp exporting countries in serious 
negotiations with the objective of concluding an international agreement for 
the protection and conservation of sea turtles, before enforcing the ban in 
this case.52  By this and other reasons, the Appellate Body concluded that the 
TREM in this case failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article 
XX, and, therefore, was not justified under Article XX of GATT.53 
Afterwards, the United States corrected its discriminative 
application of the measure and negotiated an international agreement for 
the protection of sea turtles with the appellant and further offered technical 
assistances to the appellant in order to comply with the 1998 
recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body. The Appellate 
Body in the phase of the compliance examination under Article 21.5 of the 
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Dispute Settlement Understanding made forward further and observed that 
the chapeau of Article XX does not necessarily require the conclusion of an 
international agreement but only the serious and good faith efforts for the 
conclusion of it.54  After all, the unilateral TREM of the United States in this 
case was permitted under Article XX and therefore under the GATT. 
This ruling may suggest that a TREM based on a 
non-product-related PPM, even if it is unilateral one, would be permitted 
under the GATT under a certain condition. And if so, this case would show 
that the ‘multilateralism’ under Article XX adopted by the panels of 
Tuna/Dolphin cases was withdrawn. 
VI. A Concluding Remark: An ‘Evolutionary’ Role of the Appellate Body? 
Given the highly controversial characteristics of the problem of ‘trade and 
environment,’ some people argue that panels and the Appellate Body should 
not decide disputes concerning such a problem and avoid being involved in 
political conflicts between environmentalists and free traders. These people 
argued that any perceived ‘delegalization’ of WTO dispute resolution 
proceedings would threaten to delegitimize these proceedings.55 
  One of the Tuna/Dolphin panels, as noted above, also expressed some 
doubt about the appropriateness of the panel’s deciding disputes concerning 
TREMs based on a non-product-related PPM. According to this panel, its 
task was limited to the examination of the matter ‘in the light of the relevant 
GATT provisions.’56 After all, the panels of this case came to the conclusion 
unfavorable to environmental values by adopting the ‘product-based 
regulation approach’ and the ‘multilateralism’ in the framework of regulation 
under the GATT. The result of this case provoked deep antipathy against the 
GATT among environmentalists at the world wide level and threatened to 
delegitimize the GATT itself. It triggered the very controversy of ‘trade and 
environment’ of today. 
  In such a context, the behavior of the Appellate Body in recent two 
cases, the Asbestos and the Shrimp/Turtle, is noteworthy. The Appellate 
Body implied the possibility of breaking through the barriers of the 
‘product-based regulation approach’ and the ‘multilateralism.’ The door is 
slowly being opened for TREMs based on a non-product-related PPM. Its 
ruling was more environmentally sensitive and welcomed by 
environmentalists.57 
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  However, the door is also being opened for the ‘unilateralism.’ This 
has caused some to suspect that the Appellate Body may have exceeded the 
jurisdiction and mandate set forth in the DSU. After the Shrimp/Turtle 
decision, many developing Members of the WTO criticized the case and 
argued that the Appellate Body added to or diminished certain rights and 
obligations present in the covered agreements, and in so doing encroached 
upon the rights and responsibilities of the Members.58 According to the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, the Appellate Body cannot add to or 
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.59 
  The WTO dispute settlement system depends on Member confidence. 
It will only remain legitimate and effective if the Members believe that the 
Appellate Body is interpreting the covered agreements as negotiated, as 
opposed to modifying them.60 There is divergence of opinions whether the 
Appellate Body modified the rules of GATT in the recent two cases. If the 
Appellate Body remained, however, interpreting, instead of modifying the 
rules of GATT ‘in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of 
nations about the protection and conservation of the environment,’61 its 
rulings may well deserve praising as ‘evolutionary’ interpretation.62 When 
we realize that due to the WTO’s insistence on the consensus decision 
making, the political bodies of the WTO were often unable to legislate clear 
rules resolving policy differences between Members, the evolutionary ruling 
of the Appellate Body, as far as it remains being within its jurisdiction and 
mandate, should be appreciated affirma t i v e l y .  I n  t h i s  s e n s e ,  I t  c a n  b e  
remarked that the Appellate Body does not need to ‘live with a quiet but 
uneasy status quo’63  in the ‘trade and environment’ disputes. 
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